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MILDRED OBERHANSLEY,
individually and as members of
the 37th Utah State Legislature
comprising the Utah Legislative
Council,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.

11912

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by the Attorney General of the State of Utah under the Utah Declaratory
1

Judgment Act, (Title 78, Chapter 33, Utah Code An.
notated, 1953), seeking to have declared as unconstitutional Section 36-4-12, Utah Code Annotated
(Supp. 1953).
Section 36-4-12 was enacted by the Legislature
under the Laws of 1947 Chapter 67, and was amended by the Laws of 1967, Chapter 71, Section 1. The
amendment provided for the payment of $25.00 per
day and expenses to members of the Legislative Councile and authorized the appointment of certain subordinates. The case was originally brought by the
then Attorney General Phil L. Hansen, but since the
election of Vernon B. Romney as successor Attorney •
General, the parties by stipulation and by order of
the court denominated Mr. Romney as plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding Section 36-4-12, ,
Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1953) constitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks affirmation of the lower
court's decision.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The statement of facts contained in the brief of
the appellant is accurate and a further statement •
will not be made by respondents except as necessary
in presenting their argument.
2

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SENATE BILL 183 (CHAPTER 71, LAWS OF
UTAH, 1967) INSOFAR AS IT PURPORTS TO
AMEND SECTION 36-4-12, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) IS CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE VI, SECTION 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

When Senate Bill 183 was passed by the 37th
Legislature, Section 7 of Article VI of the Utah Constitution read as follows:
No member of the Legislature, during the
term for which he was elected, shall be appointed or elected to any civil office of profit
under this state, which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which shall have been
increased, during the term for which he was
elected.
The statute in question, Section 36-4-12 Utah
Code Annotated ( 1953), was amended by Senate Bill
183 in 1967 to read as follows:
Members of the Council and the chairman
and vice chairman and members of any subcommittee appointed to the council thereto
shall be paid a per diem of $25 :per day and ?e
reimbursed for actual expenses incurred while
attending said session.
A. IN REVIEWING ALLEGED DEFECTS
IN SENATE BILL 183, ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY IS PRESUMED.
Legislation duly enacted by the legislature is
3

presumed valid. In determining the constitutionality
of legislation the "consistent" rule of construction is
well stated in Manning vs. Sims, 308 Ky. 587, 213
s.w. 2d 577, 580 ( 1948) :
. In. passing upon the constiutionality of
legislative .acts, courts are guided by certain
well-established rules. One of these rules is
that when the power of the Legislature to enact a law is in question, the court should proceed with the greatest possible caution and
should never declare an act invalid until after
every doubt has been resolved in its favor.
Our courts "have been sensitive to the
rule that an Act should be held valid unless it
clearly offends the limitation and prohibitions '
of the constitution. The burden is upon one
who questions the validity of an Act to sustain
his contentions ... " (citations omitted). The ·
presumtion in favor of constitutionality is
strong.
A statute must be held constitutional unless it
clearly violates a provision of the constitution. Every
doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute must be
resolved in favor of its validity. A court should hold
legislative acts constitutional unless it is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that they are unconstitutional. This principle has been enumerated by a long
line of Utah decisions. Great Salt Lake Authority vs.
Island Ranch Co., 18 U. 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963 (1966);
Wood vs. Budge, 13 U. 2d 359, 374 P.2d 516 (1962);
State vs. Guerts, 11 U. 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961).
B. A LEGISLATOR APPOINTED TO THE
4

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OR TO A SUBCOM,
MITTEE THEREOF IS NOT APPOINTED TO A
"CIVIL OFFICE OF PROFIT" AS CONTEMPLATED WITHIN ARTICLE VI, SECTION 7 OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The critical question to be answered in determining whether Senate Bill 183 violates Section 7 of
Article VI is whether a position on the Legislative
Council constitutes a "civil office" within the meaning of the consti'tutional prohibition. A civil office
and the elements constituting the same are set forth
as follows in the area's leading case:
After an exhaustive examination of the
authorities, we hold that five elements are indispensible in any position of public employment in order to make it a public office of a
civil nature: ( 1) It must be created by the
Constitution or by the Legislature or created
by a municipality or other body through authority conferred by the Legislature; (2) It
must possess a deligation of a portion of the
sovereign of the public; (3) The powers conferred, and the duties to be discharged, must
be defined, directly or impliedly, by the Legislature or through legislative authority; ( 4)
The duties must be performed independently
and without control of a superior power, other
than the law unless they be those of an inferior
or
office, created or authorized by
the Legislature, and by it placed under the general control of a superior officer or body; ( 5)
It must have some premanency in continuity,
and not be only temporary or occasional.
5

State ex rel. Barney vs. Hawkins, 79 M:ont. 506, 529
257 Pac. 411, 418 ( 1927); See also Nichols vs. Marks'.
308 Ky. 863, 215 S.W. 2d 1000 ( 1948). It is generally
held that all five of these elements must be present
for the creation of a civil office. See State ex rel. Bar.
ney vs. Hawkins, supra.; State ex rel. Hamblen vs.
Yelle, 29 Wash. 2d 68, 76, 185 P.2d 723, 728 ( 1947).
The mos't critical element, however, which is indispensible to the creation of a civil office and virtually
always mentioned by the courts is that the office
must possess some delegation of the sovereign power
of the state. See State ex rel. Newman vs. Skinner,
128 Ohio St. 325, 191 N.E. 127 (1934); Nichols vs.
Marks, supra., at 868, 215 S.W. 2d at 1003.

Before applying the test set forth above to the
Legislative Council in question, the development and
functions of the Legislative Council should first be
elucidated for the purpose of setting forth the proper
context.
The Legislative Council was created in Utah in
1947. Its functions and duties are set forth in Section
36-4-2, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1953); these
duties have been summarized in appellant's brief.
Utah is one of 42 states which has provided a Legislative Council. As can be noted from a quick review of
the statute, the council's primary purpose is to conduct studies, to assemble data, and to formulate proposals 'to be placed before the next Legislature. The
use of such councils for such purposes dates back as
far as 1933 when legislative councils were first im6

plemented in Kansas. The Leg'islative Council Movement in the United States, 31 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
49 ( 1957).
Professor Flynn made the following observation
concerning the functions of the Council:
It has been suggested that Utah would
find its most practical solution to the problems
of time, continuity, and competence in a greater reliance on the legislative council ... [T] he
council alternative deserves particular attention since it combines many advantages suggested by other alternatives, it has been relatively successful thus far, and its structure
a 1ready exists. UTAH'S LEGISLATIVE
BRANCH, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 447.

Another student of this subject noted:
... [E] stablished legislative councils have
proven to be extremely valuable to state legislators. They have resulted in better legislation
and in uplifting the entire level of legislative
performance. These legislative councils in
their capacity of fact finding and recommendation agencies have provided the legislators
with excellent and s u b s t a n t i a 1 programs
through 'their pre-session activities. The legislative council, with an experienced and skilled
research staff, is invaluable to the legislative
body in giving it objective information. The
Leg'islative Coiincil Movement in the United
States, supra, a't 63, 64.

Against this background as to the creation and
the functions of the Legislative Council, the test here7

tofore set for th in definding a civil office should b!
applied. Preliminarily, there is little doubt that the
council was created by the legislature and therefore
meets the first requirement. Morever, the Legislature does control and direct the council's activitiei
and, therefore, the requirements of number three are
met to a large degree. Doubt does remain, however,
as to the remaining 'three elements necessary to con·
stitute a civil office. In particular with respect to tfo
fourth requirement, that the duties must be perform
ed independently and without control of the Legisla
ture or any other body, it appears that this elemen
is clearly lacking. The Council is by definition noth
ing but an arm of the Legislature continually sub
ject to its control and direction. It does not perfor11
independently of the Legislature but continues to per
form certain legislative investigative functions in th
interim period between legislative sessions. To sa
that the Council occupies the same independence an
status as other legislatively created bodies, such a
the State Road Commission or the State Tax Corr
mission, is to completely disclaim the reality of th
situation.
Problems similarly exist wi'th the fifth requir1
ment, that the office must have some permanency an
continuity. The Legislative Council was created t
the Legislature in 1947. It exists that the sufferarn
of the Legislature an<l may be abolished at any tim
Membership on the Council is reserved to
the Legislature and their term expires when th(
8
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again face re-election. On the basis of the foregoing
it is clear that the Council does not have the permanence and continuity or the independence of action envisioned within the test. More importantly, however,
the second element is lacking in that no part of the
sovereign power of the state has been delegated to the
Council.
In defining the term ''sovereign power" the
\Vashington Supreme Court in State ex rel. Hamblen
vs. Yelle, supra., at 76, 185 P.2d at 728, stated the
following:
Unless there was delegated to the members of the Legislative Council some of the
sovereign functions of government to be exercised for the benefit of the public, the position
now held by each of the members of the Legislative Council is not a civil office. Mechem on
Public Officers §4, p.5. The council members
will not legislate, execute or administer lmus
enacted by them. The only power the Legislative Council has is to collect information and
report as to the facts it finds to the next Legislature and to make its reports public. Since it
is not engaged in making laws, executing them,
or administrating them, no member of the
Council is the holder of a civil office. (Emphasis added).
In a subsequent case the Washington Supreme
Court further elaborated on the definition of sovereign power as follows:
the
However broadly or
sovereign power may be defmed, 1t is certam
9

that, .among other attributes, it embraces an
exercise
government's inherent police
P.ower, which, in turn, and by ordinary defini'tions, extends to the preservation of the pub.
lie
safety, and morals, as well as to the
regulation, preservation, promotion and development of natural resources. Oceanoaraphic
Cornrnission vs. O'Brien, 447 P.2d 707, 711
(Wash. 1968).
On the basis of the foregoing definitions, sovereign power encompasses the power to govern and
to perform all the legitimate ends and purposes of
government. It includes the power of taxation, the
power of eminent domain and the police power of the
government.
A quick survey of the powers and duties of the
Legislative Council as set forth in Section 36-4-2,
Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1953) reveals tha't the
indicia of sovereign power mentioned above are not
present in the creation of the Legislative Council. It
is a fact-finding and investigative body which does
not possess the police power of the state or other pow·
ers of the state indicative of its sovereignty. Exam·
ples of state offices or committees which have been
held to have a delegation of sovereign power and
thereby come within the definition of a civil office
are as follows: A state highway commissioner, State
vs. Gooding, 22 Idaho 128, 124 Pac. 791 (1912); a
probate judge, People vs. Curtis, 1Idaho756, (1879),
an assistant to the corporation commissioner, Gibson
vs. Kay, 68 Ore. 589, 137 Pac. 864 ( 1914). See other
10

designations listed in Annot., 118 ALR 182, 183
(1939).
In applying the test outlined above, the courts
have consistently held that Legislative Councils are
constitutional; in particular these courts have held
that such councils do not possess the needed delegation of sovereign power to constitute a civil office.
For example, two cases from neighboring jurisdictions interpreting almost identical constitutional provisions to those found in the Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 7, are discussed as follows: In State
ex rel. Hamblen vs. Yelle, 29 Wash. 2d 68, 185 P.2d
723 (1947), a Legislative Council constituted along
the same lines as that created in Utah was challenged
as being repugnant to the following constitutional
provision of the vVashington Constitution:
No member of the Legislature during the
term for which he is elected shall be appointed
or elected to any civil office in this state which
shall have been created, or the emolument of
which shall have been increased, during the
term for which he was elected.
As can be seen, the provisions of the foregoing constitutional provision are virtually identical with Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution. As previously set forth in this brief, the Washington Supreme Court held that membership on the Council
did not constitute a civil office. The court specifically
found that the statute creating the Legislative Council did no more than make available additional and
11

new machinery and new methods by which the mem.
hers of the committee could keep themselves inform.
eel on specific problems and imposed no additional
duties which had not theretofore been imposed on
members of the Legislature generally. The court held
that such tasks involving the assembling of data and
the formulation of proposals to be placed before the
Legislature did not constitute a part of the sovereign
power of the state.
A second significant case in this area is State ex
rel. James vs. Aronson, 132 Mont. 120, 314 P.2d 849
( 1957). In that case the Montana Supreme Court
faced a challenge to the constitutionality of the Legislative Council of that state on the basis 'that the act
creating the Council contravened the Montana Con·
stitution which provided that "no senator or repre·
sentative shall, during the 'term for which he shall
have been elected, be appointed to any civil office un·
der the state . . ." After a rather extensive review
of the authorities in the field, the court held that an
appoin'tment to the Legislative Council did not con·
stitute a civil office in contravention of the Montana
Constitution.
These cases present facts identical in almost all
respects to the case at hand. The question before both
courts was the constitutionality of an appointment to
the Legislative Council; in both cases the appoint·
ments were challenged on the basis that they consti·
tuted a civil office in contravention of the respectiV€
12

constitutions. In both cases the courts upheld the validity of the appointments. On the basis of the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that an appointment to the Legislative Council in Utah does not constitute a civil office of profit, and, therefore, such an
appointment is consistent with Article VI, Section 7
of the Utah Constitution.
Against this line of authority, appellant contends
in its
without any reference to any authority
whatsoever, that the Legislative Council is a civil office because "the term of service is fixed and because
of its composition, it has permanency and continuity.
The Legislative Council works without any supervision and control." On the basis of these bare assertions, appellant then concludes that, "The members
of the Legislative Council are, therefore, seen to be
either appointed, or elected, to 'civil office of profit'."
Even assuming that appellant's assertions are true,
appellant has not dealt with the most critical element
in the definition df a civil office that being that such
office must posses a delegation of the sovereign power of the state. There is no discussion whatsoever anywhere in appellant's brief concerning this necessary
elemen't. By deleting this particular and most important element, apparently appellant concedes that it
is lacking in the appointment to the Legislative Council. Based on the failure of appellant to adequately
treat 'this question and based on the authorities set
forth herein, respondent respectfully submits that no
civil office of profit has been created and that Senate
13

Bill 183 is therefore not repugnant to Section 7, Ar.
ticle VI of the Utah Constitution. Since an assign.
ment to the investigating committee is not an ap.
pointment to a civil office within the meaning of Ar.
ticle VI, Section 7, the further problems under the
same section of whether the office is newly created,
or whether emoluments of the office have been invaJ.
idly increased are foreclosed.
POINT II
SENATE BILL 183 DOES NOT INCREASE
THE COMPENSATFON OF LEGISLATORS APPOINTED TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE VI
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

A. THE COMPENSATORY LIMIT ESTAB·
LISHED IN ARTICLE VI, SECTION 9 REFERS
ONLY TO THE COMPENSATION PAYABLE TO
LEGISLATORS FOR WORK PERFORMED DUR·
ING THE LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS AND DOES
NOT PRECLUDE ADDITIONAL COMPENSA·
TION FOR LEGISLATIVE WORK PERFORMED
BETWEEN SESSIONS BY INDIVIDUAL LEGIS·
LATORS.
It is contended by the Attorney General that Sen·
ate Bill 183 violates Article VI, Section 9 of the Utah

Constitution. The validity of this assertion simply
does not withstand close scrutiny. Appellant in its
brief delineates the original form of the constitution·
al provision in question and the subsequent amend·
men'ts thereto. The 1945 and the 1951 amendments
14

are most informative. The amendment which took effect on January 1, 1945 then read as follows:
The members of the Legislature shall resuch compensati?n and mileage as the
Legislature may provide, not e x c e e d i n g
$300.00 per year, and ten cents per mile for
the distance necessarily traveled going 'to and
returning from the place of meeting on the
most usual route, and they shall receive no other pay or perquisite. (Emphasis added).
The 1951 amendment stated as follows:
The members of the Legislature shall receive such compensation, not exceeding $500.00 a year for the legislative term $5.00 a day
expenses while actually in session, and mileage
as provided by law. (Emphasis added).
As is apparen't from a reading of these two amendments, three changes were made in the 1951 amendment: ( 1) The compensation was increased from
$300.00 to $500.00; (2) The compensation was made
payable for 'the legislative term; and ( 3) the limitation that legislators were not to receive any other
''pay or perquisite" was de 1 et ed. The latter two
changes have particular significance in interpreting
the constitutionality of the bill in question.
By adding the language "for the legislative
term" in the 1951 amendment, the intention emerges
to somehow qualify the amount paid per year. According to the 1945 amendment, only yearly compensation was payable. By the 1951 amendment, compensation was payable yearly for the legislative term.
15

The structure of 'the article demonstrates that thr
terms "y.early" and "legislative term" were
used advisedly and were not meant to be used inter.
changeably. The logical intent was that "legislatiw
term" was to have a meaning s e p a r a t e and apar!
from "yearly". In context i't clearly appears that thl
reference to the legislative term refers to the legislative session which is mentioned in the same section of
the 1951 amendment and that the compensation mentioned is for services rendered during the
session only. Indeed, the words
and "session''
are commonly used interchangeabley, and many
courts commonly refer to the two terms as being sy·
nonymous. See 41 Words and Phrases, (Perm. Ed.).
577. One such court has stated that "the word 'ses·
sion' is defined as 'the time, period, or term during
which a court, council, Legislature, etc., meets daily
for business' .. ."Emerson vs. Missouri K & T.R. Co.,
37 Tex. Civ. App. 110, 82 S.W. 1060 (1904), citing
Webster Int. Diet. (Emphasis added).
At the time Senate Bill 183 was passed, the
only regular session of the Legislature was the bien·
nial session held for 60 days. Article VI, Sections 2,
16. A member of the Legislature at that time, there·
fore would be in session only sixty days every two
'
.
years in the absence of a special session. It is for this
period of legislative activity to which the quoted
language refers. Article VI, Section 9, does not pre·
elude additional payment to legislators for work per·
formed between sessions. It is only logical to assume
16

that if new and additional responsobilities are placed
upon members of the Legislature during the interim
period between sessions that the same should be compensable to cover the personal sacrifice involved.
Such a position is supported by the authorities. For
example, in the case of State ex rel. James vs. Aronson, 132 Mont. 120, 314 P.2d 849 (1957), the constitutionality of certain payments to the members of the
Legislative Council was called into question. It was
contended that such compensation violated Article V,
Section 5 of the Montana State Constitution which
provided that legislators '' ... shall receive no other
compensation, perquisite, or allowance whatsoever."
The court held that the statute establishing the Legislative Council was constitutional and that the members were entitled to reimbursemen't for expenses despite the constitutional preclusion of any other compensation. In its decision the court referred to and
adopted the following language quoted from a former Montana case:
It is a well-settled principle of law that a
provision such as is contained in the Constitution of this state, prohibiting any law increas,.
ing or diminishing the salary or emolumen't of
a public officer after his election or appointment does not forbid the allowance of compenfor new· and different services exacted
from him/ during his term,
the statute
imposing the duties also prescribes the
pensation for their performance. 'The constitutional limitation ... was intended to apply
only 'to the salary and emolument to which the
17

was
for services required o!
h.1m by the
in force at the time of his elec.
tion or
... State ex rel. Donyei
vs. Commissioners, 23 Mont. 250, 253, 58 Pae,
439, 440 (1899). (Emphasis added).
Other jurisdictions have similarly recognized the Je.
gitimacy oi payment to state officers 'for new and ad.
di'tional duties. See Moore vs. Moore, 147 Va. 460, 31
S.E. 488 (1927) where the Virginia Supreme Courl
of Appeals held that extra compensation payable to
a state auditor was constitutional when additional
duties were imposed upon him of collecting inheri·
tance taxes which had formerly been collected by local
officials. See also San Luis Obispo Co-nnty vs. Felts,
104 Cal. 60, 37 Pac. 780 (1894); and Annot. 21 ALR
256, 258 ( 1922). This line of authority clearly ind!·
cates that when new duties are imposed upon any
state officer, additional compensation may be extend·
ed without violating constitutional restrictions.
This conclusion is buttressed by the development
of the terminology within Section 9 of Article VI of
the Utah Constitution. As noted in foregoing para·
graphs, the 1951 amendment deleted the limitation
that legislators "shall receive no other pay or perqui·
site" o'ther than the sum specified. Appellant has
taken the position that these words of !'imitation were
mere surplusage and added nothing by way of addi·
tional limitation. The obvious response to such an al·
legation is that if the words meant nothing why were
they inserted by intelligent drafters of the Constitu·
tion. A "perquisite" is defined as follows: "A 'per·
18

oi quisite' is an allowance paid in money for a thing

ec. beyond the ordinary salary or fixed wages for series vices rendered; especially a fee allowed by law to
ac. an officer for a specific service." County Auditors
vs. Anderson, 133 Pa. Super., 475, 3 A.2d 28 ( 1938).
[e. The Ohio Court had the following to say about a pertl·
quisite with regard to legislators:
A 'perquisite' within a constitutional prort
vision that members of the general assembly
to
shall receive fixed compensation prescribed by
law and no other allowance or perquisite is
al
something
gained from the place of employ]·
ment over and above the ordinary salary or
11
fixed wages for services rendered, especially a
fee allowed by law to an officer from the office
in addition to his fixed compensation, but does
not include reimbursement of such members
for their actual expenses. State ex rel. Harbage vs. Fergusrm, 68 Ohio App. 189, 36 N.E.
2d 500, 503 ( 1938).
By deleting the language that the legislators
were to receive no other pay or perquisite other than
the said compensation, a forceful inference arises
that some perquisite is authorized in certain instances
in addition 'to the specified compensation. Moreover,
by deleting this restriction, a clear intent emerges
to relaxe the stringent controls placed on the amount
and nature of compensation payable to legislators for
interim legislative work and the conclusion thereby
becomes compelling that perquisites in the form of
compensation 'for such interim work are clearly within the intent of Section 9, Artcile VI as amended. It
should be noted in this regard that the Montana
19

Court in State ex rel. James vs. Aronson, supra.,
authorized compensation to members of the Legis!a.
tive Council even in spite of the more restrictive Ian.
guage which is now deleted from the Utah Constitu.
ti on.
To date a rigid interpretation of the Utah Con.
stitution with respect to Article VI, Section 9 has not
been imposed to restrict the work of the Legislators
in conductiong their interim work. Members of the
Legislative Council which was first organized in 1947
have not been charged for office space in the Capitol
Building, electricity, telephone service, and other of.
fice expense incident to the Council work. The expenses of time of these legislative members is just as vital
as the office facilities used, and the state should be
willing to pay for such expenses in the interest of pro·
vi ding an effective legislative program. As noted
above, Article VI, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution
provides only for the compensation of legislators for
the time they are actually working in the legislative
sessions. It does not mention compensation to be paid
to legislators serving on interim legislative councils.
A practical reading of 'the Constitution suggests that
its framers intended it to be interpreted to promote
rather than frustarate the legislative process. The
policy considerations and the need for practical in·
terpretation and understanding of the Constitution
and statutes is well expressed in Shields vs. Toronto,
16 Ut. 2d 61, 395 P.2d 829 ( 1964) in which Justice
Crockett, writing the opinion, said:
20

It is obviously not possible to state all of
the law necessary to assure a well-ordered society in any such single prohibitory provision.
For this reason it cannot properly be regarded
as something isolated and absolute but must be
considered in the light of its background and
the purpose it was designed to serve; and in
relation to other fundamental rights of citizens set forth in the entire Constiution which
are essential to the proper functioning of our
democratic form of government. One of the
principal merits of our system of law and justice is that it does not function by casting reason aside and clinging slavishly to a literal
application of one single provision of law to
the exclusion of all others. Its policy is rather
to follow the path of reason in order to avoid
arbitrary and unjust results and to give recognition in the highest possible degree to all of
the rights assured by all of the constitutional
provisions.
In short, Article VI, Section 9 sets a limitation
on compensation payable to legislators for in-session
work only and does not preclude compensation for additional legislative functions performed in the interim period between sessions. The fore going conclusion
is more than adequately supported by the development of the article under question and the amendments thereto and by the authorities.
POINT III
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 9, IN ITS PRESENT
FORM OPERA TES RETROACTIVELY TO VALIDA TE THOSE PROVISIONS OF SENATE BILL
183 WHICH ARE ALLEGEDLY REPUGNANT
TO THAT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION.
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The case at bar was filed on May 9, 1967. On No.
vember 5, 1968, in a general election the
amendment to Article VI, Section 9 was approved by
the electorate and became effective on January 1
1969:
I

The members of the Legislature shall re.
ceive $25 per diam while actually in session
expenses of $15 per diem while actually in ses'.
sion, and mileage as provided by law.
As is readily apparent, the amendatory language is
largely couched in terms identical to those set forth
in Senate Bill 183. The similarity is more than co·
incidental. If the court holds that Senate Bill 183 is
repugnant to Article VI, Section 9 as it existed on
May 9, 1967, this constitutional defect has since been
cured by the amendment to the above constitutional
prov1s10n.
It has long been recognized in constitutional law
that a constitutional amendment may operate retroactively to validate antecedent unconstitutional legis·
lation, but only in certain circumstances. See Ma·
thews vs. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932, 938-39, (Alaska
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 517 (1962); Hopkim
vs. Anderson, 218 Cal. 62, 21 P.2d, 560, 561 ( 1933).
As the Alaska Supreme Court stated in Mathews:
We recognize the legal principle that a
constitutional provision, which from the Ian·
guage used shows expressly or by
iniplication that it was intended to operate
retrospectively to validate
uncon·
stitutional legislation, renders vahd all such
22

O·

1g

ly

I,

legislation to which the constitutional provision relates without re-enactment by the Legislature ...
cases
have
bearing on
the subJect reqmre that the validating constitutional provision must make some reference
however slight or inferential, to the
intended to be validated. Mathews vs. Quinton,
supra., (Emphasis added).
It is respondents' position that the circumstances
surrounding the passage of the amendment, the
words used and the obvious objects to be accomplished all indicate by necessary implication that the
amendment was intended to operate retrospectively
to cure possible alleged constitutional defects in Senate Bill 183.

As noted above, the action was commenced May
9, 1967. This was one of several actions filed by the
then Attorney General challenging legislation passed
by the Legislature that year some of which was under
attack for the same reason set forth in this case. With
full cognizance of the existence of the present suit
and other similar actions, the amendment to Article
VI. Section 9 was submitted to the electorate in 1968
and approved. Significantly the amendment approved by the electorate embodied language almost identical to that set forth in Senate Bill 183. Such similarity of language, it must be assumed, was not accidental but purposeful. Considering the similarity of
this language, and the existence of lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of legislative salary increa23

ses, the in'tent clearly emerges, though not specifically
stated in the amendment itself, that antecedent legig.
lation 'then under attack regarding per diem allow.
ances for legislators in performing functions in the
interim, should be validated. As adopted the amend.
ment removed the compensatory ceiling of $500 and
provided a legislative salary of $25 per diem "while
actually in session." Payment for interim activities
is not excluded. Since the ceiling is removed and com.
pensation as specified is payable only for in-session
activities, the constitutional objections raised by ap·
pell ant under the former provisions of Aricle VI,
Section 9 are removed; hence, even i'f Senate Bill were
unconstitutional at is inception, amendments to Ar·
ticle VI, Section 9 have since cured this alleged defect.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Senate Bill No. 183 providing for
payment of actual expenses and $25 per diem expense
is valid.
1. There is a strong presumption that legisla·
tion is valid and the court should proceed on that pre·
sumption unless it is clearly shown to the contrary.
2. A legislator appointed to the Legislative
Council is not appointed to a "civil office of profit" as
contemplated within Article VI, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution since the elements necessary for the ere·
ation of a civil office are not present in the Legisla·
tive Council.
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3. Senate Bill 183 does not increase the compensation of legislators appointed to the Legislative
Council in violation of Section 9 of Article VI of the
Utah Constitution in view of the fact that the limitations contained in that particular section refer only
to work preformed during the legislative sessions.
Compensation envisioned under Senate Bill 183 is for
new, different and additional responsibilities of legislators to be performed in the interim period between
legislative sessions.
4. Office and operational expenses have been
and are historically provided members of the Legislative Council for business conducted between sessions of the Legislature. A clear indication that the
$500 limitation was not intended to apply to expenditures of time and money for indespensible work of
legislators performed between sessions is thus indicated.
5. A practical reading of the Constitution
would suggest that it is within the language and the
intent of the framers to compensate the members of
the committee who contributed so much to the efficient function of Utah government.
6. Even if Senate Bill 183 is found to be unconstitutional as of its inception, the amendment to
Article VI, Section 9 which became effective January
1, 1969 removed the constitutional infirmaties with
respect to that article.
On the basis of the foregoing it is respectfully
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submitted that the judgment of the lower court shoulu
be sustained in upholding the constitutionality of
Senate Bill 183.
Respectfully submited,
REX J. HANSON
P. KEITH NELSON
HANSON & BALDWIN
Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys forRespondents
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